Why do states pursue economic forms of statecraft? My research develops a theory of problem-solving statecraft to explain how states gain power by providing solutions to problems faced by other states. I conceptualise state initiatives as statecraft and argue that initiators seek to convert provision into political access, diplomatic influence, and strategic advantage in pursuit of long-term security and survival. Rather than relying solely on coercion, initiators deploy national capabilities to address problems that participating states cannot easily resolve alone. My work uses comparative historical analysis to trace how this process operates across different periods and political settings. My PhD examined the Prussian Zollverein of 1834 and showed that the Marshall Plan and the Belt and Road Initiative are not exceptional cases. Across history, states have used problem-solving provision as a route to influence, access, and power.
I wish to have more conversations with scholars interested in statecraft, economic power and International Relations theory.
This chapter unpacks the transformative power of the Socratic method for teaching international relations (IR) theory at the undergraduate level. Students of IR theory need to critically reflect on distinctive perspectives to build their own standpoints of global politics, and the Socratic dialogue offers an answer to the ongoing concern of passive learning. Following this exploration, the chapter elucidates the essence of the classical Socratic method, introduces my innovative adaptation for teaching IR theory, and discusses the benefits and challenges as reflections of my experience. Reviving the classical way of teaching, I argue that the Socratic method enhances student engagement, fosters independent thinking, and nurtures self-reflective personalities.
Offensive Realists as Optimists: Initiatives as Self-help – Article manuscript to International Security submission in July 2026 - manuscript completed
Gossip and Stigma in International Relations - Article manuscript. Presented at EISA workshop and BISA conference; revised in response to workshop feedback; submission in September 2026
German Economic Nationalism in the 19th Century — Article manuscript (dissertation-derived); case study on the Prussian statecraft and its connection to security; submission in August 2026
Title: Peaceful Economic Statecraft for Power Competition: Lessons from Prussia
How can a state pursue power competition without war? This paper argues that the Prussian Zollverein is an offensive realist account of peaceful economic statecraft. Existing work often treats the Zollverein either as a step toward German national integration or as a liberal story of commercial cooperation preceding the European Union. By contrast, this paper argues that Prussia utilised a customs union as a deliberate instrument of economic statecraft to improve its relative position within the German Confederation. The paper makes three claims. First, economic openness can serve competitive rather than pacifying purposes. Second, Prussia’s leadership of the Zollverein shows how states can accumulate influence through peaceful and non-coercive mechanisms. Third, the paper challenges the theoretical assumption that offensive realist competition must be expressed primarily through military expansion. This paper employs process-tracing of archival materials in English and German. Findings show that Prussia converted the leadership of customs affairs into a geopolitical advantage and weakened Austria’s capacity to shape the German political order. Lessons from Prussia show that offensive realists do not object cooperation, they simply ask who gains more from it.